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Abstract—This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale
power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their
physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an attacker-
defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to
determine the worst-case consequences of FDI attacks aiming to
maximize the physical power flow on a target line. Understanding
the consequences of these attacks requires consideration of power
system operations commonly used in practice, specifically real-
time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security constrained eco-
nomic dispatch (SCED). An ADBLP is formulated with detailed
assumptions on attacker’s knowledge, and a modified Benders’
decomposition algorithm is introduced to solve such an ADBLP.
The vulnerability analysis results presented for the synthetic
Texas system with 2000 buses show that intelligent FDI attacks
can cause post-contingency overflows.
Index Terms—False data injection attack, cyber-security, vul-
nerability of N − 1 reliable power system, bi-level optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The efficiency and intelligence of modern electric power
systems are increasing rapidly with integration of real-time
monitoring, sensing, communication and data processing. This
integration is accomplished via a cyber layer consisting of
the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system
in conjunction with the energy management system (EMS).
SCADA monitors the physical system, collects measurements,
and sends them to the control center. In the EMS, state esti-
mation (SE) estimates the voltage magnitudes and angles from
measurements. This estimate along with the subsequent data
processing, optimization and communication, specifically real-
time contingency analysis (RTCA) [1] and security constrained
economic dispatch (SCED) [2], allow for real-time control of
the power systems.
However, the integration of the cyber layer also increases
the threat of cyber-attacks on power systems that could lead
to severe physical consequences, as illustrated by the recent
cyber-attack in Ukraine (see [3]). Therefore, it is crucial to
develop techniques to detect and thwart potential attacks,
which requires evaluating system vulnerability to credible at-
tacks. Assessing consequences of possible attacks is extremely
instructive for system operators, and is important for secure
power system operations.
This paper focuses on false data injection (FDI) attacks,
wherein a malicious attacker replaces a subset of SCADA
measurements (power flows and injections) with counterfeits.
FDI attacks can be designed to target system states [4]–[6],
system topology [7], [8], and energy markets [9]. Optimization
problems have been proposed to design FDI attacks that aim
to maximize line power flow [10], change locational marginal
prices [11], or maximize operating cost [12]. However, the
results have only been demonstrated for small systems, and
do not include the effects of N − 1 reliability constraints.
N − 1 reliable system operations typically involve RTCA to
generate security constraints, and SCED to re-dispatch the
generators with the security constraints in the most economic
sense. In this paper, we focus on the worst-case FDI attacks
that maximize power flow on a target line, but our goal is
to evaluate vulnerability of significantly larger systems (i.e.
thousands of buses) with AC SE, RTCA, and SCED.
The authors of [10] introduce an unobservable FDI attack
that re-distributes the loads by changing SCADA measure-
ments, to trigger generation re-dispatches that result in phys-
ical overflow on a target line. The authors show that the
worst-case attack can be found using an attacker-defender bi-
level linear program (ADBLP), wherein the first level models
the attacker’s objective and limitations, and the second level
models the system response through DC optimal power flow
(OPF). In this paper, we formulate a similar ADBLP with
the second level modeled as SCED instead of OPF, taking
into account the security constraints generated by RTCA. We
also discuss in detail the required knowledge of an attacker to
design such an unobservable attack.
Techniques to solve ADBLPs with applications to power
systems have been studied in [13], [14], but are limited to
scenarios with the same objective for both levels, and hence,
their techniques cannot be applied to either the problem in [10]
or its generalization considered here for large power systems.
An ADBLP can be reformulated as a mathematical program
with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [15] by replacing the
second level by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
However, MPECs are non-convex and hard to solve efficiently
in general [16]. The MPEC from the ADBLP can be further
reformulated as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) by
rewriting the complementary slackness constraints as mixed-
integer constraints. As the system size increases, this MILP be-
comes harder to solve due to the increasing number of binary
variables. In this paper, we introduce an efficient algorithm
that utilized Benders’ decomposition to solve ADBLPs.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) Knowledge requirement for attacker to design unobserv-
able attacks in the presence of RTCA and SCED;
2) Attack design ADBLP modeling SCED as the second
level problem;
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3) Modified Benders’ decomposition algorithm to solve AD-
BLPs;
4) Simulations of the designed attacks on the synthetic Texas
system to evaluate the consequences of such attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec.
II describes the power system measurement model and unob-
servable attack model. Sec. III discusses attacker’s requirement
to design and launch worst-case unobservable attacks. Sec.
IV introduces an ADBLP to find worst-case attacks. Sec.V
describes the modified Benders’ decomposition algorithm to
solve any ADBLP. Sec. VI presents the simulation results on
the Texas system. Sec. VII concludes the paper and considers
directions of future work.
II. SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
A. EMS Operation
In this paper, we consider an EMS with three core functions
operating in the order of SE, RTCA, and SCED. The EMS
operating structure is illustrated in Fig. 1. Power system
measurement data collected by SCADA are sent to SE, which
estimates the complex voltages after eliminating noise and
bad measurements. Given the generator set points, SE also
estimates the load values in the system. Modern power systems
typically require N−1 reliability, i.e., the system must operate
with no violations if a contingency occurs (one of the system
components, generators or branches, is out of service). RTCA
simulates one power flow under each contingency k. We say
a branch has a warning if its power flow is above a threshold
τ but less than its limit, while a branch has a violation if its
power flow exceeds its limit. Note that in base case, the limit
is the long-term line rating, while in contingency case it is the
short-term rating. Each warning and violation generates one
line limit constraint to be modeled in SCED. In contingency
cases, these constraints are called security constraints. SCED
takes all these constraints and solves an optimization problem
to determine the most economic generation dispatch that
ensures N − 1 reliable operation.
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Fig. 1: EMS operation with SE, RTCA, and SCED.
B. Measurement Model
We model the power system with nb buses, ng generators,
and nm measurements. The SCADA system measurement
model is given by
z = h(x) + e (1)
where z is the nm × 1 measurement vector; x is the 2nb × 1
vector of bus voltage magnitudes and angles (states); h(·) is
the non-linear relationship between measurements and states;
e is the nm × 1 vector of measurement noise, whose entries
are assumed to be jointly distributed as N (0,R) where R =
diag(σ21 , σ
2
2 , . . . , σ
2
nm).
C. Unobservable Attack Model
An nm× 1 measurement attack vector a = z¯− z is defined
to be unobservable to the residual-based bad data detector
(BDD) if a = h(x+ c)− z, where z¯ is the vector of the false
measurements created by the attacker and c is the state attack
vector [6]. Given c, an attack subgraph S can be constructed as
in [6], such that the non-zero entries of a are all within S. By
modifying measurements only in S, the attacker can arbitrarily
spoof the states of center buses (load buses corresponding to
non-zero entries of c) without detection. The attack causes
the system estimated load to re-distribute between load buses
within S, while the total load remain unchanged.
III. ATTACKER ASSUMPTIONS
Among all unobservable FDI attacks, the most dangerous
ones are those with serious physical consequences. In this
paper, we focus on a class of unobservable attacks where
the attacker maliciously changes the SCADA measurements
to maximize the power flow on a target line, and possibly
cause overflow. The authors of [10] introduce an ADBLP to
determine the worst-case unobservable line overflow attack,
wherein the first level models the attacker’s objective and
limitations, while the second level models the system response
via DCOPF. Assuming the attacker has knowledge of (i) the
complete network topology (including line parameters and
ratings) and load information, and (ii) the cost, capacity, and
operational status of all generators in the system, the authors
show that unobservable attacks found using this optimization
successfully result in generation re-dispatches that cause line
overflows on the IEEE RTS 24-bus system.
However, modern power systems typically do not use
DCOPF to re-dispatch the generation, but rather operates as
outlined in Sec. II-A. An attacker who gains knowledge of
EMS operations has an advantage to accurately predict the
system response. In other words, if the attacker is able to
perform the same RTCA and SCED as the system does, it
can design attacks that maximize the consequences. This is a
stronger assumption than that in [10], because in addition to
having access to the database of the control center, now the
attacker further knows the algorithms and assumptions used by
the system. While this is a stronger requirement, it is valuable
to understand how the system is resilient against such strong
adversaries through this worst-case approach.
In RTCA, the attacker needs to know the power flow
algorithm used to get the same post-contingency flows on all
lines, as well as the threshold τ as described in Sec. II, to
determine the security constraints to be included in SCED.
In SCED, the attacker should know how the system models
the constraints, as different system operators may implement
SCED differently. We assume the attacker has full knowledge
of RTCA and SCED implementation in the EMS, in particular:
1) Contingency ratings of the branches;
2) Loss handling method;
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3) Ramp rates and reserve costs of all generators;
4) Reserve policy and requirements;
5) Criteria to determine which base case line limits are to
be modeled. This can be the same threshold as τ in post-
contingency case, but can also be different;
6) Branch flow calculation method in both base case and
contingency case;
7) Load shedding policy and costs.
While it seems unrealistic to gain such knowledge, it is
not entirely impossible, since such complex systems involve
sophisticated (even nation-state) attackers that can exploit or
have access to insider knowledge [3], [17]. Again, this is the
worst-case assumptions, and therefore, resilience of the system
to such worst-case attacks can serve as an upper bound on risks
to the system operations.
IV. ADBLP TO FIND WORST-CASE ATTACK
In this section, we introduce an ADBLP similar to that in
[10] to find worst-case line overflow attacks. The first level
models the attacker’s objective and limitations, while the sec-
ond level models the system response via SCED. We focus on
RTCA that simulates branch contingencies (excluding radial
branches), and reports corresponding security constraints to
SCED. Contingency k indicates that branch k is out of service.
The attacker is assumed to be able to perform RTCA and
pick a target line l to maximize its power flow when target
contingency kt occurs, and possibly create overflow. Without
loss of generality, we assume the flow on l is positive; if it
is not the case, its absolute value can be maximized. In the
formulation below we assume the attacker aims to maximize
post-contingency power flow on the target line, but the base
case power flow can also be maximized. Since SCED is DC,
the voltage magnitudes are all considered to be 1 p.u., and
hence, c is an nb × 1 attack vector on the voltage angles. III.
The ADBLP takes the following form:
maximize
c
Pl,kt − σ ‖c‖1 (2a)
subject to
Pl,kt = OTDF
l
kt(GBP
∗
G − PD) (2b)
‖c‖1 ≤ N1 (2c)
− LSPD ≤ Hc ≤ LSPD (2d)
{P ∗G} = arg
{
min
PG,RG,P,Pk
CG (PG) + CRRG
}
(2e)
subject to∑ng
g=1 PGg =
∑nb
i=1 PDi (2f)
P¯ = P0 + PTDF(GB(PG − PG0) +Hc) (2g)
P¯k = Pk0 + OTDFk(GB(PG − PG0) +Hc) (2h)
+ LODFk · PTDFk ·Hc, ∀k
− Pmax ≤ P¯ ≤ Pmax (2i)
− Pk,max ≤ P¯k ≤ Pk,max,∀k (2j)
PG ≥ max{PG0 −MGTh, PG,min} (2k)
PG ≤ max{PG0 +MGTh, PG,max} (2l)
0 ≤ RG ≤MGTr (2m)
PG +RG ≤ PG,max (2n)∑ng
g=1RGg ≥ PGg +RGg ,∀g (2o)
where the variables are:
c attack vector, nb × 1;
P¯ , P¯k vectors of monitored line cyber power flows in
base case and under contingency k, respectively;
Pl,kt physical power flow on target line l under target
contingency kt;
PG power output of generators, ng × 1;
RG spinning reserve of the generators, ng × 1;
and the parameters are:
σ penalty of the l1-norm of attack vector c;
GB generators to buses connectivity matrix, nb × ng;
OTDFk outage transfer distribution factor matrix under
contingency k;
OTDFlk l
th row of OTDFk;
N1 attack vector l1-norm limit;
LS load shift factor, in percentage;
H dependency matrix between power injection mea-
surements and states, nb × nb;
PD vector of real loads, nb × 1;
CG generation cost vector, ng × 1;
CR reserve cost vector, ng × 1;
P0, Pk0 vectors of pre-SCED monitored line power flows
in base case and under contingency k, respec-
tively;
PG0 pre-SCED generator outputs, ng × 1;
PTDF power transfer distribution factor matrix;
PTDFk kth row of PTDF;
LODFk line outage distribution factors of monitored lines
under contingency k;
Pmax vector of base case line limits;
Pk,max vector of line limits under contingency k;
PG,min generation lower limits vector, ng × 1;
PG,max generation upper limits vector, ng × 1;
MG ramp rates of all generators, ng × 1;
Th look-ahead time for one period SCED;
Tr time for spinning reserve requirement.
Expression in (2a) captures the attacker’s objective of max-
imizing the power flow on line l under target contingency
kt, and the penalty factor σ is a small positive number to
limit the attack size; constraint (2b) is the calculation of the
power flow on line l under target contingency kt; (2c) models
the attacker’s limited resources. Ideally, l0-norm should be
used to precisely capture the sparsity of c, but for tractability
reasons we use the l1-norm as a proxy. Constraint (2d) limits
the percentage of load changes at each bus to avoid detection.
SCED (2e)-(2o) models the system response to the attack.
The objective of the operator (2e) is to minimize the total
cost, consisting of generation cost and reserve cost; constraint
(2f) is the power balance equation; (2g) is the cyber power
flow of the base case monitored lines. Note that this constraint
is only modeled for the lines whose pre-SCED power flow
is greater than the threshold τ , i.e., |P0/Pmax| ≥ τ . This
is under the assumption that the line flows will not change
dramatically after the SCED re-dispatch, due to the ramping
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constraints of the generators. Similarly, (2h) is the cyber
power flows on monitored lines under each contingency k,
where |Pk0/Pk,max| ≥ τ . Here we assume the base case
and contingency case monitoring thresholds are the same. In
the right hand side of (2h), the first term is the pre-SCED
post-contingency flows; the second term is the change of the
flows as a result of re-dispatch and false loads; the third
term represents the amount of power on the monitored lines
resulting from the effect of false loads on the contingency
line k, which is not considered in Pk0. Constraints (2i) and
(2j) are the line limits in base case and contingency case,
respectively. The active power limits in both base case and
contingency cases, Pmax and Pk,max, are approximated from
the MVA ratings and reactive flows on the branches by
Pmax =
√
S2max − [max(Qfrom, Qto)]2 (3)
Pk,max =
√
S2k,max − [max(Qk,from, Qk,to)]2 (4)
where Smax and Sk,max are branch long-term and short-term
ratings, respectively; Qfrom and Qto are the base case reactive
branch flows at the "from" end and "to" end, respectively;
Qk,from and Qk,to are those flows in contingency cases. Con-
straints (2k) and (2l) are the ramping limits; (2m) is the reserve
limit; (2n) is the generation limit. Though the RTCA does not
simulate generator contingencies, in SCED it is required that
when a generator is out, the reserves of all other generators are
sufficient to cover the output of the lost generator. We assume
the SCED does not include a load shedding policy.
V. MODIFIED BENDERS’ DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM
TO SOLVE ADBLPS
ADBLPs with different objectives in the two levels are in
general non-convex. The authors of [10] solve their ADBLP
by replacing the second level defender’s problem by its KKT
conditions and then convert the problem into an MILP, but
this approach does not apply to large-scale systems due to
the numerical difficulty brought on by large number of binary
variables. To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing
techniques to solve large-scale ADBLPs efficiently. In this
section, we introduce a modified Benders’ decomposition
(MBD) algorithm to solve ADBLPs. Benders’ decomposition
[18] is an iterative approach to solve linear programs in a
distributed manner [19]. It is a popular technique to solve
optimization problems of large size or with complicating
variables. It is also effective in solving complex optimization
problems such as stochastic programs and mixed-integer linear
programs. In Benders’ decomposition, an optimization prob-
lem is decomposed into two sub-problems, wherein variables
of each sub-problem are treated as constant in the other.
The two sub-problems are solved iteratively until the solution
converges. Our MBD algorithm modifies the classic Benders’
decomposition algorithm to apply it on any ADBLP.
An ADBLP takes the following form (dual variable of the
defender’s problem is in parentheses):
minimize
u
cT1 u+ d
T
1 v
∗ (5a)
subject to
A1u ≥ b1 (5b)
v∗ = arg{min
v
dT2 v} (5c)
subject to
A2u+A3v ≥ b2 (β) (5d)
where u and v are the attacker’s and defender’s decision
variables, respectively. The defender has no control on u, and
hence, u in (5d) is treated as a constant in the defender’s
problem. The attacker does not directly control v, but it
controls v∗ by changing u, assuming it has knowledge of the
defender’s objective and constraints.
The attack optimization ADBLP (2) fits in the form of (5)
where the attack vector c is represented by u and SCED
variables PG, RG, P , and Pk are represented by v. In the
attacker’s objective function, cT1 u represents the term −σ ‖c‖1,
and dT1 v
∗ represents the term Pl,kt in (2a). Equality constraints
can be equivalently written as two inequality constraints. For
example, (2f) can be written as
1TPG ≥ 1TPD (6a)
−1TPG ≥ −1TPD (6b)
which fits the form of (5d). One can similarly map all the
constraints in (2) to those in (5).
The defender’s problem (5c)–(5d), which represents the
system response (SCED) to a fixed attack vector, has the
following dual problem (note that u is treated as constant here
since it is the fixed attack vector from the attacker’s problem):
maximize
β
βT (b2 −A2u) (7a)
subject to AT3 β = d2 (7b)
β ≥ 0. (7c)
By weak duality [20], for any feasible primal/dual pair, the
dual objective value is always less than the primal one:
βT (b2 −A2u) ≤ dT2 v. (8)
Since the defender’s problem is a linear program, it satisfies
strong duality. That is, any feasible point (v, β) that satisfies
βT (b2 −A2u) ≥ dT2 v (9)
is an optimal solution to it. Therefore, constraints (5d), (7b),
(7c), and (9) guarantee the optimality of the defender’s prob-
lem, and hence, can be used to convert the ADBLP to a single
level problem as:
minimize
u,v,β
cT1 u+ d
T
1 v (10a)
subject to A1u ≥ b1 (10b)
A2u+A3v ≥ b2 (10c)
AT3 β = d2 (10d)
βT b2 − βTA2u− dT2 v ≥ 0 (10e)
β ≥ 0. (10f)
The bilinear term βTA2u in (10e) is non-convex and hard
to solve. To overcome this difficulty, Benders’ decomposition
is utilized to decompose this optimization problem into two
problems, with u as the variable for the master problem (MP)
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and v, β as the variables for the slave problem (SP). The MP
takes the following form:
minimize
u,α
cT1 u+ α (11a)
subject to A1u ≥ b1 (11b)
where α is a variable introduced to represent dT1 v
∗, which will
then be updated by adding cuts. The SP is given by:
minimize
v,β
dT1 v (12a)
subject to βT b2 − dT2 v − βTA2u ≥ 0 (δ) (12b)
A3v ≥ b2 −A2u (γ) (12c)
AT3 β = d2 (λ) (12d)
β ≥ 0. (12e)
At the optimal solution of the SP given by (12), we have
dT1 v
∗ = γT b2 + λT d2 − γTA2u. (13)
An optimality cut can be added to the MP by taking the right
hand side of (13):
α ≥ γT b2 + λT d2 − γTA2u. (14)
Note that (14) is in the MP, and therefore, u is again a variable.
If the SP is infeasible with a given u, slack variables si, i =
1, 2, 3, can be introduced to all of the SP constraint to solve
the relaxed SP:
minimize
v,β,si
dT1 v (15a)
subject to βT b2 − dT2 v − βTA2u+ s1 ≥ 0 (δˆ) (15b)
A3v + s2 ≥ b2 −A2u (γˆ) (15c)
AT3 β + s3 = d2 (λˆ) (15d)
β ≥ 0. (15e)
where si, i = 1, 2, 3 are the slack variables introduced to
ensure feasibility of the relaxed SP. Then, instead of an
optimality cut (14), a feasibility cut is added to the MP:
0 ≥ γˆT b2 + λˆT d2 − γˆTA2u. (16)
The MP and SP can then be solved iteratively, with the MP
updating u and the SP updating cuts in each iteration.
Algorithm 1 Modified Benders’ Decomposition for Bi-level
Linear Programs (MBD)
1) Set the iteration number j = 1 and let u(0) = 0.
2) Solve the SP (12) with u = u(j−1).
3) If the SP is infeasible, solve the relaxed SP (15)
and obtain (γˆ(j), λˆ(j)), then add a feasibility cut of
form (16) to the MP. Otherwise, solve SP (12) to get
(v(j), β(j), γ(j), λ(j)), and add an optimality cut of form
(14) to the MP.
4) Solve the MP with added cuts and obtain the solution
(u(j), α(j)).
5) If |dT1 v(j)−α(j)
α(j)
| < , stop. The optimal objective value is
obtained as cT1 u
(j)+dT1 v
(j). Otherwise, let j = j+1 and
go to step 2).
Solving the SP is equivalent to solving the second level
SCED under attack (2e)−(2o), while the dual variables of the
SP provide information on the objective function (2a). Since
each cut is formulated linearly on the u domain, adding cuts to
the MP does not affect its convexity. Thus, MBD is guaranteed
to converge in a finite number of iterations [21]. However,
due to the non-convexity of the original bi-level optimization
problem, global optimal solution cannot be guaranteed [22].
Therefore, the optimal objective value obtained by MBD,
Pˆ ∗l,kt , is a lower bound on P
∗
l,kt
, the global optimal objective.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present physical consequences through
simulations of the attacks designed using the ADBLP de-
scribed in Sec. IV. We use the synthetic Texas system with
2000 buses, 3210 branches, and 432 generators [23]. The
inputs to the ADBLP described in Sec. IV are obtained
from OpenPA [24], a Java-based EMS simulation platform
that we developed in collaboration with our industry partners
IncSys [25] and PowerData [26]. Without attack, the system
is operating at steady-state, which means that SCED does not
change the generation dispatch between each EMS loop. In
the base case power flow solution, the total losses among the
system is 2% of the net load. We assume the SCED handles
losses by uniformly increasing all loads by this percentage.
RTCA simulates contingencies of all branches whose end bus
voltages are both at least 100 kV, except radial branches. Prior
to attack, RTCA reports no base case warnings nor violations,
and 25 post-contingency warnings. We exhaustively design
attacks targeting each of those 25 contingency case warnings
and test the attack consequences. In our simulations, the short-
term branch limit is assumed to be 115% of the long-term
limit, i.e., Sk,max = 115% × Smax; the warning threshold
τ = 90%; MBD convergence tolerance  = 5× 10−5; SCED
look ahead time Th = 15 minutes; spinning reserve time
Tr = 10 minutes. The ADBLP is solved using Matlab with
solver CPLEX on a 3.4 GHz PC with 32 GB RAM.
A. Approach for Attack Implementation and System Vulnera-
bility Assessment
Fig. 2 illustrates the implementation of the attack and the
vulnerability assessment approach. For simplicity, we assume
that the real loads remain unchanged during the attack period.
The physical system behavior and the SCADA measurement
collection are simulated by solving an AC power flow. The true
measurements z1 from the power flow solution are acquired
by the attacker to estimate the states (denoted xˆ1). It then
performs AC power flow-based RTCA to achieve the security
constraints and solves the attack design ADBLP to find the
attack vector c. Recall that the second level of the ADBLP
is a SCED in response to the attack, and by solving it the
attacker obtains an estimate on the maximal physical power
flow on the target line, which is the optimal objective Pˆ ∗l,kt .
To implement the designed attack, the attacker then constructs
false measurements z¯1 = h(xˆ1 + c) and injects z¯1 to the
system SE instead of the true measurements z1. Again, only
the measurements in the attack subgraph S are changed. Since
the generator outputs are known to the system, the false
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measurements will cause the SE to estimate a set of false
loads. RTCA and SCED are then performed by the system to
determine the new optimal generation dispatch P ∗G in response
to the false loads. Once the generators re-dispatch, the attacker
again acquires the true measurements z2, and estimates the
new states xˆ2. It then sends z¯2 = h(xˆ2 + c) to the system SE
to estimate new false loads. The system operator again runs
RTCA with the new false loads and observes the cyber power
flow P¯l,kt . However, the new dispatch applied on the physical
system, will maximize the physical power flow on target line l
under target contingency kt, and possibly cause overflow. The
true physical power flow, Pl,kt , is obtained by running RTCA
with the new dispatch and real loads.
B. Results on Maximal Physical Power Flows
Fig. 3 compares physical power flow Pˆ ∗l,kt predicted by the
attacker, the true power flow Pl,kt in the physical system, as
well as the power flow (cyber) seen by the system operator
P¯l,kt , as a function of the l1-norm constraint N1. These power
flows are plotted as percentage values relative to the active
power limit Pl,k,max calculated using (4). The attacker’s goal
is to maximize the power flow on line ‘ln-2025-2055’ when
line ‘ln-2054-5236’ is out of service.
When the load shift LS = 10%, Pˆ ∗l,kt and Pl,kt increase
as N1 increases. This indicates that the attacks are effective:
they successfully cause post-contingency overflows that cannot
be seen by the system operators. When LS = 20%, similar
results are observed, but Pˆ ∗l,kt and Pl,kt are not monotonically
increasing as N1 increases. This suggests that the MBD algo-
rithm provides sub-optimal solutions, because as N1 increases,
the constraints are relaxed, and the optimal solution for a
larger N1 should be at least that of a smaller N1. Maximal
power flow is higher when a larger load shift is allowed. With
LS = 20%, N1 = 0.2, the power flow is higher than that when
LS = 10%, N1 = 2, which indicates that in this case load shift
is the dominant constraint.
The true physical power flow Pl,kt is slightly lower than
the attacker predicted physical power flow Pˆ ∗l,kt . One possible
reason for this phenomenon is that the attacker is solving a
DC approximation of an AC system, and the reactive power
flow may change after attack. This could result in a difference
in Pl,k,max before and after attack. Another possible reason
is that the false measurements z¯1 injected by the attacker
cause a different set of security constraints than those that
the attacker used to solve the attack design ADBLP. The
attacker generates the security constraints by running RTCA
using the true measurements, but those constraints generated
by the system RTCA are based on the false measurements
after attack. As a result, the system SCED solution may be
different than the attacker predicted re-dispatch. One approach
for the attacker to prevent this situation is to run its own
RTCA using the false measurements and include any newly
appeared security constraints into the attack design ADBLP,
until there are no more new security constraints. However,
this approach has no convergence guarantee, and could be too
time-consuming to launch the attack in real-time.
Note that in order for the attacks to actually cause post-
contingency violations requires a particular contingency to
Power Flow
System SCED
System State Estimator
System RTCA
Power Flow
System State Estimator
Attacker’s RTCA
RTCA
Attack Design ADBLP
Create False Measurements
RTCA
Create False Measurements
System Response 
to Attack
Cyber Consequences Physical Consequences
Attacker’s State Estimator
Attacker’s State Estimator
Fig. 2: Attack implementation and system vulnerability
assessment approach.
occur. Thus, the attacker has to create the target contingency
itself, or gain insider knowledge about when the contingency is
likely to occur. Both are plausible for sophisticated attackers.
More aggressively, the attacker can aim to create base case
overflows, but the N − 1 reliable constraints may push the
system to operate conservatively. In the synthetic Texas sys-
tem, there is no branch whose base case power flow is higher
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Fig. 3: Comparison of attacker predicted, physical, and cyber
power flows on line ‘ln-2025-2055’ under contingency
‘ln-2054-5236’, (a) LS = 10%; (b) LS = 20% .
than τ prior to the attack. Thus, to cause base case overflow,
the attacker has to shift a tremendous amount of load that
may easily trigger an alarm at the control center. Moreover,
a large load shift will move the system operating condition
dramatically with high probability, and thereby create new
security constraints that are not considered when designing
the attack. Thus, the consequences of the attack become
unpredictable for the attacker. We have attempted to design a
base case attack targeting branch ‘ln-7058-7095’ that has the
highest base case power flow in percentage, but no overflow
can be found with LS = 90% and N1 = 20. With LS = 100%
and N1 = 20, the attacker’s predicted power flow reaches
102.29%, but the false measurements create 3197 warnings
and 24773 violations at the RTCA solution.
C. Results on Attack Resources
Fig. 4 illustrates the relationship between maximal power
flow and l0-norm of the attack vector (i.e. the number of center
buses in the attack) versus the l1-norm constraint N1 for target
line ‘ln-2025-2055’ under contingency ‘ln-2054-5236’, with
different load shift constraints. As N1 increases, so does the l0-
norm of the attack, indicating that l1-norm is a valid proxy for
l0-norm for our problem. If a larger load shift is allowed, the
maximal power flow on target line increases, but the resulting
l0-norm may decrease for the same N1. This indicates a trade-
off between load shift and attacker’s resources: as the attacker
attempts to avoid detection by minimizing load changes, it will
require control over a larger portion of the system to launch
a comparable attack.
D. Comparison of Physical and Cyber RTCA results
Fig. 5 compares the physical and cyber RTCA results after
the re-dispatch resulting from an attack on target line ‘ln-
2025-2055’ under contingency ‘ln-2054-5236’ with load shift
LS = 10%, N1 = 2. The cyber post-contingency power flows
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the l0-norm of the attack vector for
target line ‘ln-2025-2055’ under contingency ‘ln-2054-5236’.
on the x-axis represent what the system operator observes,
while the y-axis represents the post-contingency power flows
in the physical system. There is no point beyond 100% of the
x-axis, which indicates that the system operator sees no post-
contingency violation after the attack. Therefore, the attack
successfully spoofed the operator that the system is in a
secure state, while in reality, the target line has a 112.2%
post-contingency overflow. In addition, there are four post-
contingency violations that are caused by the same attack, even
though they are not the attacker’s targets.
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Fig. 5: Comparison of the physical and cyber RTCA results
after re-dispatch.
E. Statistical Results on Attack Consequences
As mentioned at the beginning of Sec. VI, we exhaustively
tested attacks targeting the 25 branches with post-contingency
warnings. The designed attacks successfully cause overflows
on 8 out of the 25 target branches. Table I gives the statistical
results on attack consequences of these 8 branches. We derived
attacks using l1-norm constraints in the range from N1 = 0.2
to N1 = 2. The table shows the resulting ranges in maximal
power flow and l0-norm of the attack vector c across this
range. The load shift constraint LS = 10%. The prefix ‘ln’
indicates a transmission line and ‘tx’ indicates a transformer.
From the maximal power flow range, we can see that some
branches are more vulnerable than others, as they have higher
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overflows. Thus, the system operators can identify critical
lines and critical contingencies for attack protection purposes.
For example, they can artificially reduce the line limit to
keep the attack from being successful. Measurements around
vulnerable branches can be encrypted to prevent them from
being modified. In our ADBLP, the load shift constraint
characterizes the detectability of the attack, indicating that load
abnormally detectors can help system operators distinguish
between natural load changes and possible cyber attacks based
on load redistribution.
TABLE I: Statistical Results on Maximal Physical Power
Flow and l0-norm of the Attack Vector with N1 ∈ [0.2, 2]
Target Contingency Max PF Range (%) ‖c‖0 Range
ln-6188-7305 ln-7058-7095 101.92–105.08 133–442
ln-6240-6287 ln-6141-6239 102.43–106.76 137–314
ln-7233-7251 tx-6063-6062 105.41–107.90 156–485
ln-1003-1055 ln-3046-3078 102.80–102.94 163–520
ln-2025-2055 ln-2054-5236 107.98–111.00 90–461
ln-2070-5237 ln-2054-5236 101.35–104.35 90–461
ln-1003-1055 ln-1004-3133 102.43–102.56 160–513
ln-7059-7407 ln-7058-7406 100.38–102.24 154–488
VII. CONCLUSION
We have evaluated the vulnerability of N − 1 reliable
power systems to unobservable FDI attacks via the physical
consequences of such attacks. Such N-1 reliable systems are
assumed to be operated by an EMS consisting of SE, RTCA,
and SCED. The attacker injects intelligently designed false
measurements to the SE that bypass the bad data detector, and
cause the SE to estimate false loads. The SCED re-dispatch
resulting from the false loads leads to the power flow on a
target line (picked by the attacker) to be maximized.
We have also highlighted the knowledge required by the
attacker to design such attacks. In the worst case, the attacker
can perform exactly the same RTCA and SCED as the system
does, and hence, can approximately predict the system re-
sponse to the attacks. Designing these attacks involves solving
an ADBLP that is non-convex and difficult to solve in general.
An efficient algorithm based on Benders’ decomposition is
introduced to solve the attack design ADBLPs.
The designed attacks can successfully cause post-
contingency overflows on target branches. Moreover, they
may create more violations on branches other than the target
one. Our vulnerability assessment approach can help system
operator identify critical branches and critical contingencies to
design protection schemes. Future work will include designing
countermeasures to detect, identify, and mitigate such attacks.
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